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JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a final order entered August 13, 2002 by Judge
William L. Bohling, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. Jurisdiction of this appellate Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. §782A-3(2)(j)(2001). The Supreme Court of Utah transferred these proceedings to the
Appeal Court by order dated October 23, 2002, pursuant Utah Code Ann. §78-22(4)(2001).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Under the governing language of Utah Code Ann. §31-A-309(l)(b)(1985),
did the trial Court err by refusing to grant Appellant's motion to amend judgment by
eliminating the offset of personal injury protection [PIP] benefits against the special
damages award?
Standard of Review:
The trial Court's ruling allowing the PIP benefit offset against the special
damages award is a decision on statutory construction which must be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals for correctness, for which the trial Court's conclusions of law are
given no difference. See Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Audit Division, 938 P.2d 266,
267 (Utah 1997).
2. Did the trial Court err in refusing to grant Appellant's motion to amend the
judgement to eliminate the double application of the 10% reduction for contributory

4

negligence from Plaintiffs award of damages, where evidence substantiated the jury
had already applied the reduction?
Standard of Review:
This issue presents mixed questions of law and fact that must be reviewed for
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. See Woodhaven Apartments v.
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997).
3. Did the trail Court err in refusing to grant Plaintiffs costs?
Standard of Review:
The trail Court decision regarding costs is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,
432 Utah Adv. Reporter 44-P.3d-(Utah 2001).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE
INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
The prevailing statutory basis in this case is the no-fault section of the
insurance code. Previous case law precedent was based on the original no-fault
statute adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1973. The enlire insurance code, including
its no-fault provisions, was repealed in 1985 and replaced with the current code.
Changes in the current no-fault provisions of the insurance code dissolved the
statutory basis for treatment of personal injury protection [PIP] benefits, a core issue
in this case. Both the 1973 code (repealed) and the 1985 code, as subsequently
amended, are quoted below for ease of comparing the differences.
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Previous Insurance Code

Current Insurance Code
Utah Code Ann §31A-22-309 (2001)
(l)(a) A person who has or is required
to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury
protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages caused by
an automobile accident, except where
the person has sustained one or more
of the following:
(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment;
(iii) permanent disability or
permanent impairment based
upon objective findings;
(iv) permanent disfigurement;
or
(v) medical expenses to a
person in excess of $3,000.
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply
to persons making an uninsured
motorist claim.

Utah Code Ann. §3141-9(2) (1973)
(l)No person for whom direct benefit
coverage is provided for in this act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause
of action for general damages arising
out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile
accident except where there has been
caused by this accident any one or
more of the following:
(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment fracture;
(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement;
or,
(e) Medical expenses to a
person in excess of $500.
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle
with respect to which security is
required by this act who fails to have
such security in effect at the time of
an accident shall have no immunity
from tort liability and shall be
personally liable for the payment of
the benefits provided under section 6
of this act.

(2)(a) An insurer issuing personal
injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude . . . & etc.

Neither the language nor the substance in paragraph 2 (above) of the 1973 nofault code appears anywhere else in the current insurance statute.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, INTRODUCTION
The complaint in this case, filed September 22, 2000, sought damages for the
Plaintiffs suffering and medical expenses incurred in an August 28, 1997
automobile accident caused by the Defendant, who turned his automobile left in
front of the plaintiff, failing to yield and causing the collision.
B. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The case was tried to a jury April 2-4, 2000. The jury returned its special
verdict, awarding special damages in the amount of $5,126 and general damages in
the amount of $10,000. The Court first reduced both the special damages and
general damages by 10% based upon the jury verdict assigning Plaintiff contributory
negligence of 10%. The Court then offset the special damages by an additional
$3,565.47, the amount that the Plaintiff had received in PIP benefits. Judgement
was ultimately entered on April 29, 2000 in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant in the amount of $10,047.93. On May 6, 2000 the Plaintiff filed a motion
to amend the judgement. After briefing and oral argument, the trial Court denied the
Plaintiffs motion to amend the judgement, pursuant to an order entered on August
14, 2002. The Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 2002.

C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1. On August 28, 1997, Plaintiff was traveling west on 1300 South in Salt
Lake City, Utah, approaching the 900 West intersection. Defendant was eastbound
on 1300 South, positioned in the left turning lane at 900 West. Plaintiff had the
right-of-way as she entered the 900 West intersection, but Defendant turned
immediately in front of her, causing their vehicles to collide. Plaintiff sustained
injuries; her car was a total loss.
2. At trial, Plaintiff established that she had incurred medical expenses of
$3,565.47. The Defendant, Lowell Isom, paid no portion of that amount.
3. On April 3, 2002, the jury received its instructions (Addendum, Exhibit 1),
and the special verdict form (Addendum, Exhibit 2) from the Court.
4.

At noon on April 4*\ the jury submitted a note to the Court during

deliberations, which said: "Do we account for the effect of joint negligence or does
the Court?" (Addendum, Exhibit 3)
5.

The Court answered this note, stating: "Please complete the special

verdict form exactly as written in accordance with your answers as you proceed
through the form." (Addendum, Exhibit 3).
6.
4th.

The jury concluded its deliberations at approximately 1:10 p.m. on April

The verdict divided comparative negligence between Defendant (90%) and

8

Plaintiff (10%). The Plaintiff was awarded $5,126 in special damages and $10,000
in general damages (see Addendum, Exhibit 2).
7.

In the judgement, the Court applied a 10% reduction to the special

damages award of $5,126, decreasing the amount to $4,613.40. The Court applied a
10%o reduction to the general damages award of $10,000, decreasing it to $9,000.
8. The Court's judgement further reduced the special damages award by
$3,565.47, the amount of Plaintiff s PIP benefits, subtracting that amount from the
$4,613.40 to a final total of $1,047.93.
9.

The Court entered the judgment on April 29, 2003. Plaintiff filed a

verified memorandum of costs May 3, 2001 in the amount of $863.43.
10. After briefing and hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs timely-filed
motion to amend the judgement to recover the amount of PIP benefits in the special
damages award and to recognize that the jury had already applied Plaintiffs 10%
negligence allocation to its damages awards before the Court did so a second time.
The Court also disallowed Plaintiff any costs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its ruling, the District Court relied upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and the Supreme
Court decision of Dupuis v. Niels on 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1980). The substance of the
Ivie decision allowed a grant of partial tort immunity to a tort-feasor, holding that
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there was no personal liability for the PIP benefits paid by an insurer. Both decisions
were based upon language of the insurance code that no longer exists. In 1985, the
Utah Legislature repealed the former language of Section 31-41-9(2) of the Utah
Code. The new language removed the section upon which the Court inferred in Ivie
a comparable grant of partial immunity due the tort-feasor and provided no other
statutory basis, either direct or implied, upon which this prior reasoning could be
upheld. The Utah Legislature reversed the statutory basis of this decision. The
District Court below must be reversed to conform likewise. There is no longer any
foundation in the statute to justify reducing Plaintiffs special damages award by the
amount of the PIP benefit.
The jury allocated to Plaintiff 10% of the negligence for the accident. The
District Court failed to recognize from the evidence, that the jury had applied a 10%
reduction to Plaintiffs general and special damages awards in its verdict. There are
three elements to this evidence: (1) The trial Court had given the jury a clear
instruction to comprehend contributory negligence in its calculation of damages
awarded to Plaintiff; (2) The special verdict form followed the logical sequence of
that explanation from the jury instruction; and, (3) During its deliberations, the jury
sent the Court a note, specifically asking: f,Do we account for the effect of joint
negligence or does the Court?"

The trial Court responded with this direction:

"Please complete the special verdict form exactly as written, in accordance with
your answers as you proceed through the form."
10

These are the sole elements of evidence on this issue. The jury instruction
explained the principle of dividing negligence between Defendant and Plaintiff and
provided a thorough example of how to calculate damages in the event of divided
negligence.

In its order of questions, the special verdict form provided the

mechanism for the jury to determine and assign negligence on a percentage basis.
Immediately following the question dividing negligence between Plaintiff (10%)
and Defendant (90%) is the last question of the form: "What amount would fairly
compensate plaintiff for the injuries proximately caused by the accident?" To this
question, the jury filled in the amounts for special damages and general damages.
In the case of Bishop v. GenTec, Inc, 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002), the Supreme
Court recognized appropriate circumstances in which a jury has already taken into
account the reduction for comparative negligence in its award of damages. The jury
in this case was preoccupied with its responsibility for applying the comparative
negligence assigned to the Plaintiff in awarding damages. In answering the "fairly
compensate Plaintiff question of the special verdict form, the jury took into account
the 10% reduction and hence under Bishop, supra the trial Court should not have
reduced the award a second time.
The trial Court entered the judgment in Plaintiffs favor April 29, 2002.
Plaintiff filed a verified memorandum of cost May 3, 2002. Included was a $250
expense for mediation the trial Court had ordered. Defendant made no dispute of
Plaintiffs costs except the $250 for mediation. The trial Court heard argument
11

concerning the mediation cost at the hearing on Plaintiffs motion to amend the
judgment for recovery of the PIP offset and the 10% reduction for comparative
negligence. The trial Court ruled Plaintiff was not entitled to the $250 mediation
cost.

In the order denying Plaintiffs motion to amend however, the Court

disallowed Plaintiff all of her costs.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AMEND
THE JUDGEMENT TO ELIMINATE THE PIP OFFSET
BECAUSE THE STATUTORY BASIS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S IVIE DECISION WAS REPEALED IN THE 1985
REPEAL OF THE INSURANCE CODE AND COMMON LAW
CONFERRED NO RIGHT OF OFFSET TO DEFENDANT
SINCE HE DID NOT PAY THE PIP BENEFITS.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) the Utah
Supreme Court construed the then-existing Utah No-Fault Insurance Act to provide
for the means whereby an insured tort-feasor, such as the Defendant, did not have
any personal liability for payment of PIP benefits. The Court did so by the following
language:
Section 2 of the act provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain
prescribed benefits in respect to motor vehicle accidents through
either insurance or other approved security, but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of an injured person to pursue
the customary tort claims where the most serious type of injuries
occur. . .
(1) No person for whom direct benefit
coverage is provided for in this act shall be allowed to
maintain a cause of action for general damages arising
out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused
12

by an automobile accident except where there has
been caused by this accident anyone or more of the
following:
(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
(c) Permanent disability; or
(d) Medical expenses to a person in excess of
$500.
(2)The owner of a motor vehicle with respect
to which security is required by this act who fails to
have such security in effect at the time of an accident
shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be
personally liable for the payment of the benefits
provided for under Section 31-41-6. [Emphasis
added]
Under this statutory plan, first party PIP benefits up to the
amount provided in Section 6 are paid to an injured person without
regard to fault. Furthermore, the injured party is precluded from
maintaining an action to recover general damages (all damages
other than those awarded for economic loss), except where the
threshold requirements of Section 9(1) are met. Under Section 9(2),
there are two consequences to the owner of a motor vehicle who
fails to have the security required by Section 5: first, he has no
immunity from tort liability; second, he is personally liable for the
benefits provided under Section 6. The only logical inference is that
if a party has the security required under Section 5, the no-fault
insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial Tort
immunity; second, his not personally liable for the benefits provided
under Section 6. ( See: Ivie, supra 606 P.2d at 1199-1200.)

The Supreme Court interpreted this statute with the only logical inference of
the then-existing statutory language, that an insured tort-feasor would be free of
personal liability for the PIP benefits. In the 1981 decision of Dupuis v. Nielson, 624
P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court endorsed a method of handling the PIP
benefits issue in a jury trial similar to that used by the trial Court below in this case.
13

Specifically, the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial Court's decision to allow
evidence of the total medical expenses to be presented to the jury, but then provided for
an offset of the special damages by the amount of PIP benefits paid to the Plaintiff. The
Dupuis, supra, decision, which was based upon the Ivie analysis, was proper under the
then-existing statute.
In 1985 the Utah State legislature adopted a revision of the entire insurance code.
In this revision, the statutory basis of Ivie, supra, was eliminated. Pursuant to that
change, Utah Code Ann. 31-41-9(2)(1953) was replaced with the following language of
Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-302(b)(1985):

Utah Code Ann.
31-41-9(2)(1973)
2) The owner of a motor vehicle
with respect to which security is
required by this act who fails to
have such security in effect at the
time of an accident shall have no
immunity from tort liability and
shall be personally liable for the
payment of the benefits provided
under section 6 of this act.

Utah Code Ann.
lA-22-302(b)(1985)
(b) Subsection (lXa) does not apply to a
person making an uninsured motorist
claim.

In making this change, the Utah Legislature eliminated the language
"shall be personally liable for the payment of the benefits provided for under
section. . ." 31-41-6, which was the basis of the Ivie, supra, decision. The statutory
revision took away the foundation of PIP benefit immunity for an insured tort-
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feasor. The current language of the statute is unambiguous and therefore its plain
language should be applied, a doctrine of interpretation the Utah Supreme Court
has firmly entrenched. See Blackner v. State, 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2001).
The trial Court overlooked this statutory change and the resulting
dissolution of the Defendant's grant of tort-feasor partial immunity for PIP benefits
that was reserved under the prior language. The trial Court should have recognized
that without the statutory protection provided by the prior language, the Defendant,
who did not personally pay any of Plaintiffs medical expenses, had no right of
offset and was liable for these special damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme
Court has devised definite criteria for grounding the right of subrogee offset.
Defendant meets none of them. See State Farm Mut. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins., 912
P.2d 983 (Utah 1996). In refusing to modify the judgement to set aside the offset,
the trial Court erred and this Court should correct that error by reversing the trial
Court's decision on the treatment of PIP benefits.

H. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE
JURY HAD ALREADY APPLIED THE 10% REDUCTION OF
DAMAGES FOR THE PLAINTIFFS COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A
SECOND 10% REDUCTION.

The Utah Supreme Court in Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 48 P.3d 218 (Utah
2002) recognized that under appropriate circumstances, a trial court should adjust a
judgement to recognize that a jury has already applied the comparative negligence
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award reduction and not reduce the award a second time. This is just such a case
and the trial Court below committed error in not amending the judgement to
account for the second reduction of the award.

This Court must look to the

evidence to determine the legitimate foundation of this issue. There are three parts
to this evidence: (1) jury instruction; (2) the special verdict form; and (3) the
content of a note exchanged between the judge and jury.
The jury in this case below was given the following instruction for
comprehending comparative negligence in its verdict:
If you find that the Defendant was negligent, you may
decide if the Plaintiff was also negligent. If the Plaintiff was
negligent, and the Plaintiffs negligence was a proximate cause
of the Plaintiffs own injury, the Plaintiffs negligence must be
compared to the negligence of the Defendant.
A Plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50% of the
total negligence caused by Plaintiffs injury, may still recover
compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the amount
of Plaintiffs negligence. If the Plaintiffs negligence is equal
to or greater than the negligence of the Defendant, then the
Plaintiff may recover nothing. For example if you find the
Plaintiffs negligence was 30% of all negligence causing the
injury, then the Plaintiffs recovery would be reduced by 30%.
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiffs negligence is
50%) or greater, then the Plaintiff will recover nothing.
The special verdict form was simple and provided an uncomplicated
mechanism to unambiguously develop the intent of this jury instruction for
comprehending comparative negligence with its sequence of only six questions,
which the jury answered as follows:
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MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions. If six of you
are persuaded by the evidence in favor of the question,
answer it "yes." If, on the question, six of you are not so
persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against
the question presented, answer it "no."
1. Was the defendant negligent?
ANSWER: Yes X _ No
(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no
further and return to the courtroom.)
2. If you answered No. 1 above "yes," was such
negligence a proximate cause of the accident?
ANSWER: Yes X
No
(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no
further and return to the courtroom.)
3. Was the plaintiff negligent?
ANSWER: Yes X

No

4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such
negligence a proximate cause of the accident?
ANSWER: Yes X
No
5. If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4
above, then what percentage of the negligence should be
allocated to defendant, and what percentage of negligence
should be allocated to plaintiff?
Plaintiff

10

Defendant

%

90 %

(Total must equal 100%)
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6. What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the
injuries proximately caused by the accident?
Special Damages

$ 5,126°°

General Damages

$ 10,000°°

The jury instruction explained the principle of dividing negligence
between Defendant and Plaintiff by elucidating the option that the jury could find
both the Plaintiff and the Defendant negligent in the "proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs own injury. . ."
The example furnished further reinforcement to the intent of 'whether
and how5 the jury was instructed to conform its verdict for comprehending
comparative negligence in the amount, if any, of a damage award. The language of
the jury instruction is specific. That specificity is germane to reasoning an accurate
conclusion :
A Plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50% of the
total negligence caused by the Plaintiffs injury, may still
recover compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the
amount of Plaintiff s negligence. [Emphasis added]
This sentence is evidence that the jury understood there was a direct
relationship between the percentage of Plaintiff s negligence and the compensation
amount Plaintiff might recover.
If the Plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than
the negligence of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff may
recover nothing. [Emphasis added]

This succeeding sentence is further evidence that it was the jury's duty to
compare the negligence of the Plaintiff to the negligence of the Defendant and
award the Plaintiff nothing if her percentage exceeded his. Hence, the amount of
her award would be nothing.

The jury instruction proceeds to confirm this

understanding with a precise example of how the principle is applied:
For example, if you find the Plaintiffs negligence was
30% of all negligence causing the injury, then the Plaintiffs
recovery would be reduced by 30%. [Emphasis added]
The example demonstrates again, with specific language, that it was
the jury's duty to first establish negligence, then divide it on a percentage basis
between Defendant and Plaintiff, then reduce Plaintiffs recovery by the percentage
of negligence assigned her. The overall logical intent of the instruction example is
bolstered by this last sentence:
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiffs
negligence is 50% or greater, then the Plaintiff will recover
nothing. [Emphasis added]
Evidence establishes that the substance of the jury instruction for
calculating damages conferred upon the jury the responsibility for reducing
Plaintiffs damage award by the percentage of comparative negligence assigned
her.

10

The language is specific in relating the percentage of negligence to the
amount of recovery, indicating that comparative negligence of 30% meant recovery
was reduced by 30%, and finishing with the direction that if Plaintiff s negligence
exceeded 50%, she would recover nothing, an amount of zero.
There is evidence that the jury was preoccupied with the question of
whether it was responsible for applying the comparative negligence reduction
assigned to Plaintiff in calculating her damages. At noon on April 4th, the jury
exchanged notes with the judge on the subject The jury's note read:

"Do we

account for the effect of the joint negligence or does the Court?" The Court
properly responded with the following additional instruction: "Please complete the
special verdict form exactly as written, in accordance with your answers as you
proceed through the form.iy
Evidence establishes the jury gave serious consideration to applying
Plaintiffs 10% share of comparative negligence to the damage award, a question
significant enough to prompt a note for clarification to the Court. The jury had
been deliberating at least four hours before submitting the question. It apparently
had already determined the comparative negligence division between Defendant
and Plaintiff by that time and was in the process of computing damages, or the
question would not have been prompted. The only remaining question for the jury
to decide was the amount of Plaintiffs damages. Another 70 minutes elapsed
before that decision was finalized and the jury notified the Court it had reached a

20

verdict.

Evidence establishes the jury gave considerable time to ensuring the

correct method of calculating Plaintiffs damages, which included their clear
instruction to apply Plaintiffs percentage of comparative negligence to the amount
of damages awarded. Absent other language to the contrary in the instructions, or
evidence the jury followed another course, no other conclusion is reasonable.
Under such circumstances, the trial Court should not have made a second
10% reduction and should have amended the judgement when timely requested to
do so. This Court should recognize the error of the trial Court and utilize the
discretion given it by the Bishop, supra decision to reverse that error and instruct
the trial Court to award judgement for the full $5,126 in special damages and
$10,000 in general damages.

ffl. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF S COSTS.
The trial Court entered the judgment April 29, 2002. Plaintiffs verified
memorandum of costs under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
filed timely on May 3, 2002 in the amount of $863.43. That total included $250.00
for mediation costs, mediation the Court had ordered in advance of trail. This
Court has previously held that an award of mediation as cost, is within the
discretion of a trial court. See: Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508
(Utah App. 1999) Defendant did not dispute any of Plaintiff s costs except the $250
for mediation.
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When Plaintiff filed the motion to amend the judgment to recover the PIP
offset and the double application of the 10% comparative negligence reduction, the
trial Court heard argument concerning only the $250 mediation cost and denied
granting Plaintiff this cost.
In its order denying Plaintiffs motion to amend the judgment, the trial
Court denied Plaintiff all her costs, not just the mediation expense. This total denial
of costs, both for court-ordered mediation and other undisputed costs, is an abuse of
discretion which requires this Court to reverse the trial Court.

CONCLUSION
This Court should recognize that the 1985 change in the Insurance statute
eliminated the statutory basis for the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) on the issue of PIP benefit/partial
immunity for the Defendant. The trial Court's decision to allow an offset of the
special damages was without a basis because there is no current statutory
foundation for it. Further, since the Defendant did not pay the PIP benefits himself,
he has no right of offset at common law or under Supreme Court precedent of State
Farm Mut. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996). This Court should
reverse this error and direct the trial Court to amend the judgement accordingly.
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This case is similar to Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 48 P.3d 218(Utah 2002), in
which it is clear from evidence in the record that the jury applied Plaintiffs
comparative negligence to her damages awards. In such cases, the trial Court
should not make a second reduction and the trial Court's refusal to amend the
judgement and eliminate the second reduction was error. This Court should reverse
that error and direct the trial Court to amend the judgement accordingly.
The trail Court below abused is discretion by not awarding the Plaintiff
her costs, including costs of mediation.

DATED: March 3, 2003

wan
Duane H. Gillman
McDowell & Gillman, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of March 2003,1 caused to be placed in
the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies
of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellant to:
ROBERT H. HENDERSON
Post Office Box 112350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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A D D E N D U M EXHIBIT 1

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff was
also negligent If the plaintiff was negligent and the plaintiffs negligence was a proximate cause
of the plaintiffs own injuries, the plaintiffs negligence must be compared to the negligence of the
defendant.
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the total negligence causing
the plaintiffs injuries may still recover compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the
percentage of the plaintiffs negligence. If the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than the
negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiff may recover nothing. For example, if you find the
plaintiffs negligence was 30 percent of all negligence causing the injuries, then the plaintiffs
recovery will be reduced by 30 percent. On the other hand if you find the plaintiffs negligence is
50 percent or greater, then the plaintiff will recover nothing.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against one or both
defendants, then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that
you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained. The amount of
such award may include the following:
A.

"Special Damages,'* or the reasonable value of medical care required

for treatment of the plaintiff, as well as plaintiffs lost wages and out-of-pocket
expenses.
B.

"General Damages," for pain, discomfort, and suffering both mental

and physical.
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA GILLMAN,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CASE NO. 000907532

Plaintiff,
vs.
LOWELL H. ISOM,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions. If six of you are persuaded by the
evidence in favor of the question presented, answer it "yes." If, on the question, six
of you are not so persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against the
question presented, answer it "no."
1. Was the defendant negligent?
ANSWER: Yes Y

No

(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no further and return to the
courtroom )

-2-

2.

If you answered No 1 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate

cause of the accident?
ANSWER: Yes

'

No

J

(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no further and return to the
courtroom.)
3.

Was the plaintiff negligent?
ANSWER: Yes

4.

X
No
U
If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate

cause of the accident?
ANSWER: Yes

\

No
\5

5.

If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, then what

percentage of the negligence should be allocated to defendant, and what percentage
of negligence should be allocated to plaintiff?
Plaintiff
Defendant

/0 %
_32_%
(Total must equal 100%)

-36.

What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the injuries

proximately caused by the accident?
Special Damages

$ J" 1ISf ft

L

General Damages

$ ' '< 000

Dated this ^ day of April, 2002.

JURY FOREPERSON^

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3
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31A-22-309

INSURANCE CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
with a motor vehicle, there is no requirement
that the insured must be operating or occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage
but only that he be in an accident involving a
motor vehicle Coates v American Economy
y
Ins Co , 627 P2d 92 (Utah 1981)

ANALYSIS

Limitation of policy covering driver
Motorcycle driven by insured
Out-of-state incidents
Cited
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Passenger in an automobile driven by insured's son but owned by another person was
not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP)
coverage under a policy covering the driver
McCaffery v Grow, 787 P2d 901 (Utah Ct App
1990)
Motorcycle driven by insured.
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was
applicable to an msured killed while ridmg a
motorcycle involved m an accident in this state

Out-of-state incidents.
In light of language limiting apphcation of
former provisions to accidents in this state
insurance commissioner's regulation making
no-fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents occurring outside the state was in error
1ML Freight, Inc v Ottosen, 538 P2d 296
(Utah 1975), Neel v State, 889 P2d 922 (Utah
L995), overruled on other grounds
Cited m Pennington v Allstate Ins Co , 973
P2d 932 (Utah 1998)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-

surance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A L R 4th 149

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to
personal injury protection,
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under
a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a
cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged
to have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person
has sustained one or more of the following.
(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment;
(hi) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon
objective findings;
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply to a person making an uninsured
motorist claim.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the
policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
380
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(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition
incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials,
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation
or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on
active duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof
is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
I* 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74,
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1; 2000,

ch. 222, § 5; 2001, ch. 59, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1,2000, substituted "WorkersJ Compensation Fund created under Chapter
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surance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to claims
of the insured.
(5) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
Section 7. Application of coverage.
(1) The coverages described in section 6 of this act shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an accident
in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occuring in this
state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the described
motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured
in an accident involving the described motor vehicle.
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall be afforded
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident
arose
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 6 of this act
shall be reduced by:
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's compensation
plan or any similar statutory plan; and
(b) Any amounts which t h a t person receives or is entitled to receive from
the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlistment, duty
or service.
Section 8. Payment of benefits.
Payment of the benefits provided for in section 6 of this act shall be made
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the insurer receives reasonable
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35 days after such
proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim
that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if riot paid
within 35 days after such proof is received by the insurer. In the event the
insurer fails to pay such expenses when due, the amount of these expenses
shall bear interest at the rate of 1-1/2% per month after the due date, and
the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action in contract to
recover these expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required
by such action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer shall
also be required to pay a reasonable attorney's fees to the claimant.
Section 9.

Exceptions to limitations on damage claims.

(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages arising
out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident except where there has been caused by this accident any one or more
of the following:
(a) Death,
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
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(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500.
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required
by this act who fails to have such security in effect at the time'of an accident
shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be personally liable for
the payment of the benefits provided for under section 6 of this act.
Section 10.

Exclusive benefits.

(1) Any insurer may exclude benefits:
(a) (i) For injury sustained by the injured while occupying another motor
vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy, or (ii) for an
injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle
without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful
possession of the insured motor vehicle.
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct contributed to his injury under any of the following circumstances:
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or
(ii) While committing a felony.
Section 11.

Conditions insurers to abide by.

(1) Every insurer authorized to write the insurance required by this act
shall agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in
the State of Utah:
(a) That where its insured is or would be held legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under this
act have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance fund, it
will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such benefits, but not
in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable, and
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount of
same shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
Section 12.

Departmental authorization.

The department is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary for the purposes of this act.
Section 13.

Violation a misdemeanor Security identification card—Enforcement.

(1) Any owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which a security is
required under this act, who operates this vehicle or permits it to be
operated on a public highway in this state without this security being in effect is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any other person who operates such motor
vehicle upon a public highway in this state with the knowledge that the
owner does not have such security in effect is also guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) (a) Every person while driving a motor vehicle with respect to which a
security is required under this act shall have in his possession evidence of
such security being in effect, which evidence may be in the form of an identification card approved by the department for issuance by an insurer to its
insured in respect to the motor vehicle. The driver shall display such eviden-

